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Abstract
I examine the impact of alternative monetary policy rules on a
rational asset price bubble, through the lens of an OLG model with
nominal rigidities. A systematic increase in interest rates in response
to a growing bubble is shown to enhance the ￿ uctuations in the latter,
through its positive e⁄ect on bubble growth. The optimal monetary
policy seeks to strike a balance between stabilization of the bubble and
stabilization of aggregate demand. The paper￿ s main ￿ndings call into
question the theoretical foundations of the case for "leaning against
the wind" monetary policies.
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The spectacular rise in housing prices in many advanced economies and its
subsequent collapse is generally viewed as a key factor underlying the global
￿nancial crisis of 2007-2009, as well as a clear illustration of the dangers
associated with asset pricing bubbles that are allowed to go unchecked.
The role that monetary policy should play in containing such bubbles
has been the subject of a heated debate, well before the start of the recent
crisis. The consensus view among most policy makers in the pre-crisis years
was that central banks should focus on controlling in￿ ation and stabilizing
the output gap, and thus ignore asset price developments, unless the latter
are seen as a threat to price or output stability. Asset price bubbles, it
was argued, are di¢ cult ￿ if not outright impossible￿to identify or measure;
and even if they could be observed, the interest rate would be too blunt an
instrument to deal with them, for any signi￿cant adjustment in the latter
aimed at containing the bubble may cause serious "collateral damage" in the
form of lower prices for assets not a⁄ected by the bubble, and a greater risk
of an economic downturn.1
But that consensus view has not gone unchallenged, with many authors
and policy makers arguing that the achievement of low and stable (goods
price) in￿ ation is not a guarantee of ￿nancial stability and calling for central
banks to pay special attention to developments in asset markets.2 Since
episodes of rapid asset price in￿ ation often lead to a ￿nancial and economic
1See, e.g., Bernanke (2002) and Kohn (2006, 2008) for a central banker￿ s defense of this
view. Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) provide a formal analysis in its support.
2See, e.g., Borio and Lowe (2002) and Cecchetti et al. (2000).for an early exposition of
that view.
1crisis, it is argued, central banks should act pre-emptively in the face of
such developments, by raising interest rates su¢ ciently to dampen or bring
to an end any episodes of speculative frenzy￿ a policy often referred to as
"leaning against the wind." This may be desirable ￿ it is argued￿ even if
that intervention leads, as a byproduct, to a transitory deviation of in￿ ation
and output from target. Under this view, the losses associated with those
deviations would be more than o⁄set by the avoidance of the potential fallout
from a possible future bursting of the bubble, which may involve a ￿nancial
crisis and the risk of a consequent episode of de￿ ation and stagnation like
the one experienced by Japan after the collapse of its housing bubble in the
90s.3
Independently of one￿ s position in the previous debate, it is generally
taken for granted (a) that monetary policy can have an impact on asset
pricing bubbles and (b) that a tighter monetary policy, in the form of higher
short-term nominal interest rates, may help disin￿ ate such bubbles. In the
present paper I argue that such an assumption is not supported by economic
theory and may thus lead to misguided policy advice. The reason for this
can be summarized as follows: in contrast with the fundamental component
of an asset price, which is given by a discounted stream of payo⁄s, the bubble
component has no payo⁄s to discount. The only equilibrium requirement on
its size is that the latter grow at the rate of interest, at least in expectation.
As a result, any increase in the (real) rate engineered by the central bank
will tend to increase the size of the bubble, even though its objective may
have been exactly the opposite. Of course, any decline observed in the asset
3See Issing (2009) or ECB (2010) for an account and illustration of the gradual evolution
of central banks￿thinking on this matter as a result of the crisis.
2price in response to such a tightening of policy is perfectly consistent with
the previous result, since the fundamental component will generally drop in
that scenario, possibly more than o⁄seting the expected rise in the bubble
component.
Below I formalize that basic idea by means of a simple asset pricing model,
with an exogenous real interest rate. That framework, while useful to con-
vey the basic mechanism at work, it fails to takes into account the bubble￿ s
general equilibrium e⁄ects as well as the possible feedback from the bubble
to interest rates implied by alternative monetary policies. That concern mo-
tivates the development of a dynamic general equilibrium model that allows
for the existence of rational asset pricing bubbles and where nominal interest
rates are set by the central bank according to some stylized feedback rule.
The model assumes an overlapping generations structure, as in the classic
work on bubbles by Samuelson (1958) and Tirole (1985). This is in contrast
with the vast majority of recent macro models, which stick to an in￿nite-
lived representative consumer paradigm, and in which rational bubbles can
generally be ruled out under standard assumptions.4 Furthermore, and in
contrast with the earlier literature on rational bubbles, the introduction of
nominal rigidities (in the form of prices set in advance) makes room for the
central bank to in￿ uence the real interest rate and, through it, the size of the
bubble. While deliberately stylized, such a framework allows me to analyze
rigorously the impact of alternative monetary policy rules on the equilibrium
dynamics of asset price bubbles. In particular, it makes it possible to as-
sess the consequences of having a central bank use its interest rate policy to
4See, e.g., Santos and Woodford (1997).
3counteract asset price bubbles in a systematic way, as has been proposed by
a number of authors and commentators.5
The paper￿ s main results can be summarized as follows:
￿ Monetary policy cannot a⁄ect the conditions for existence (or non-
existence) of a bubble, but it can in￿ uence its short-run behavior, in-
cluding the size of its ￿ uctuations.
￿ Contrary to the conventional wisdom a stronger interest rate response
to bubble ￿ uctuations (i.e. a "leaning against the wind policy") may
raise the volatility of asset prices and of their bubble component.
￿ The optimal policy must strike a balance between stabilization of cur-
rent aggregate demand￿ which calls for a positive interest rate response
to the bubble￿ and stabilization of the bubble itself (and hence of fu-
ture aggregate demand)￿ which would warrant a negative interest rate
response to the bubble. If the average size of the bubble is su¢ ciently
large the latter motive will be dominant, making it optimal for the
central bank to lower interest rates in the face of a growing bubble.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I present a partial equi-
librium model to illustrate the basic idea. Section 3 develops an overlapping
generation model with nominal rigidities, and Section 4 analyzes its equilib-
rium, focusing on the conditions under which the latter may be consistent
with the presence of rational bubbles. Section 5 describes the impact on that
5The work of Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) is in a similar spirit. In their frame-
work, however, asset price bubbles are not fully rational, and the optimal policy analysis
not fully microfounded.
4equilibrium of monetary policy rules that respond systematically to the size
of the bubble. Section 6 analyzes the optimal central bank response to the
bubble. Section 7 discusses some of the caveats of the analysis and presents
some tentative empirical evidence. Section 8 concludes.
2 A Partial Equilibrium Example
The basic intuition behind the analysis below can be conveyed by means of a
simple, partial equilibrium asset pricing example. Consider an economy with
risk neutral investors and an exogenous time-varying (gross) riskless rate Rt.
Let Qt denote the period t price of an in￿nite-lived asset, yielding a dividend
stream fDtg. In equilibrium the following di⁄erence equation must hold:
QtRt = EtfDt+1 + Qt+1g
In the absence of further equilibrium constraints,6 we can decompose the
asset price into two components: a fundamental component QF























The bubble component, de￿ned as the deviation between the asset price
and its fundamental value, must satisfy:
Q
B
t Rt = EtfQ
B
t+1g (2)
6Transversality conditions generally implied by optimizing behavior of in￿nite-lived
agents are often used to rule out such a bubble component (see, e.g., Santos and Woodford
(1997)). On the other hand models with an in￿nite sequence of ￿nite-lived agent types,
as the one developed below, lack such transversality conditions.
5It is easy to see that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the interest rate
(current or anticipated) will lower QF
t , the fundamental value of the asset. On
the other hand, the same increase in the interest rate will raise the expected
growth of the bubble component, given by EtfQB
t+1=QB
t g. Note that the
latter corresponds to the bubble￿ s expected return, which must equate the
interest rate under the risk neutrality assumption made here. Hence, under
the previous logic, any rule that implies a systematic positive response of the
interest rate to the size of the bubble, will tend to amplify the movements
in the latter￿ an outcome that calls into question the conventional wisdom
about the relation between interest rates and bubbles.
Changes in interest rates, however, may a⁄ect the bubble through a sec-
ond channel: the eventual comovement between the (indeterminate) innova-
tion in the bubble with the surprise component of the interest rate. To see
this note that the evolution over time of the bubble component of the asset






where f￿tg a zero mean martingale-di⁄erence process, which may or may
not be related to fundamentals.7 The dependence on the latter process is a
re￿ ection of the inherent indeterminacy of the bubble size. As a result, the
contemporaneous impact of an interest rate increase on the size of the bubble
depends on what one assumes regarding the correlation between the interest
rate innovation, Rt ￿ Et￿1fRtg, and the martingale-di⁄erence variable ￿t.
Thus, and without loss of generality, one can write
￿t = ￿
￿
t +  r(Rt ￿ Et￿1fRtg)
7Formally, f￿tg satis￿es Et￿1f￿tg = 0 for all t:
6where f￿
￿
tg is a zero-mean martingale-di⁄erence process orthogonal to in-
terest rate innovations at all leads and lags, i.e. Ef￿
￿
tRt￿kg = 0, for k =
0;￿1;￿2;:::.Note that neither the sign nor the size of  r are pinned down
by the theory. Accordingly, the impact of an interest rate innovation (or of
any other shock) on the bubble is, in principle, indeterminate.
In what follows I assume that f￿tg is a "pure" sunspot shock, i.e. one
orthogonal to fundamentals (i.e.,  r = 0 in the formulation above). This
seems a natural benchmark assumption. In that case a change in the interest
rate does not a⁄ect the current size of the bubble, but only its expected
growth rate. Most importantly, the previous discussion makes clear that any
case for "leaning against the wind" policies based on a negative value for
 r would rest on extremely fragile grounds, at least from the viewpoint of
economic theory.
The relation between monetary policy and asset price bubbles illustrated
by the simple example in the present section is at odds with the conventional
wisdom, which invariably points to an interest rate hike as the natural way
to disin￿ ate a growing bubble. One might argue that the partial equilibrium
nature of the previous example may be misleading in that regard, by not
taking into account the existence of aggregate constraints that may impose
limits on the size of the bubble and hence on its survival. Furthermore, the
type of policy intervention considered (i.e. an exogenous change in the real
rate) is arguably less relevant than a policy rule determining the systematic
response of the nominal interest rate to movements in the size of the bubble.
The remainder of the paper provides an example of possible failure of
the conventional wisdom regarding the e⁄ects of leaning against the wind
7policies. The analysis is grounded in a general equilibrium setting, with the
central bank following a well de￿ned interest rate rule and, hence, is immune
to the potential criticisms mentioned above.
3 Asset Pricing Bubbles in a Simple OLG
Model with Nominal Rigidities
As a laboratory for the analysis of the impact of monetary policy on asset
pricing bubbles I develop a highly stylized overlapping generations model
without capital and where labor is supplied inelastically. In equilibrium,
aggregate employment and output are shown to be constant, as in an en-
dowment economy The assumptions of monopolistic competition and price
setting in advance, however, imply that monetary policy is not neutral. In
particular, by in￿ uencing the path of the real interest rate, the central bank
can a⁄ect real asset prices (including those of bubbly assets) and, as a result,
the distribution of consumption across cohorts and welfare.
3.1 Consumers
















the bundles consumed when young and old, respectively. Note that, in each
period, there is a continuum of di⁄erentiated goods available, each produced
by a di⁄erent ￿rm, and with a constant elasticity of substitution given by ￿.
8Goods (and the ￿rms producing them) are indexed by i 2 [0;1]. The size of
each cohort is constant and normalized to unity.
Each individual is endowed with the "know-how" to produce a di⁄erenti-
ated good, and with that purpose he sets up a new ￿rm. That ￿rm becomes
productive only after one period (i.e. when its founder is old) and only for
one period; after that it no longer produces any output.8 An individual born
in period t and setting up ￿rm i 2 [0;1] can raise funds by selling stocks
at a price Qtjt(i). Each stock is a claim to a share in the ￿rm￿ s one-period
ahead dividend, Dt+1(i), but it can also be traded at t + 1 and subsequent
periods at a price Qt+kjt(i), for k = 1;2;:::Note that after one period the
stock become a pure bubble, since it no longer constitutes a claim on any
future dividends.9 Henceforth, and to simplify the notation, I drop the ￿rm
subindex i if not strictly needed.
Each young individual sells his labor services inelastically, for a (real)
wage Wt. With that income and the proceeds from the sale of his ￿rm￿ s
equity, he consumes C1;t and purchases two types of assets: (i) one-period
nominally riskless discount bonds yielding a nominal return it and (ii) shares
in new and old ￿rms, in quantities Stjt￿k and prices Qtjt￿k, for k = 0;1;2;:::,
where the t￿k subindex refers to the period of creation of the corresponding
￿rm.
8This is just a convenient device to avoid having in￿nite-lived ￿rms, whose market
value would not be bounded under the conditions that make it possible for a bubble to
exist.
9The previous assumption allows me to have an asset (stocks) whose price potentially
has both a fundamental and a bubble component (albeit they coexist only transitorily).

















is the aggregate price index and Zt denotes
the quantity of nominally riskless one-period discount bonds purchased at a
price expf￿itg, with it being the (continuously compounded) yield on those
bonds (henceforth referred to as the nominal interest rate).
When old, the individual consumes all his wealth, which includes the
dividends from his portfolio of stocks, the market value of that portfolio, and




































The remaining optimality conditions associated with the consumer￿ s prob-
lem take the following form:

















for k = 1;2;::: (7)
and where ￿t;t+1 ￿ ￿(C1;t=C2;t+1) is the relevant stochastic discount factor.
Note that once a ￿rm has paid its one-time dividend, its shares become a pure
bubble, whose market price re￿ ects investors￿expectations of the (properly
discounted) price at which they will be able to resell it in the future, as made
clear by equation (7).
Finally, and for future reference, I de￿ne the real interest rate as
rt ￿ it ￿ Etf￿t+1g
where ￿t ￿ log(Pt=Pt￿1) is the rate of in￿ ation between t ￿ 1 and t.
3.2 Firms
Each individual, endowed with the "know-how" to produce a di⁄erentiated
good, sets up a ￿rm that becomes productive after one period (when its
founder is "old"). Then the ￿rm operates under the technology:
Yt(i) = Nt(i) (8)
where Yt(i) and Nt(i) denote ￿rm i￿ s output and labor input, respectively,
for i 2 [0;1]. After its operational period (i.e., once its founder dies) the
￿rm becomes unproductive (with its index i being "transferred" to a newly
created ￿rm).
Each ￿rm behaves as a monopolistic competitor, setting the price of its





Ct, where Ct ￿ C1;t + C2;t. If one assumes that ￿rms set the price
of their good after the shocks are realized, then they choose a price P ￿
t equal
11to a constant gross markup M ￿ ￿
￿￿1 times the nominal marginal cost PtWt.




In a symmetric equilibrium, P ￿
t = Pt, thus implying a constant real wage
Wt = 1=M.
I introduce nominal rigidities by assuming that the price of each good is
set in advance, before the shocks are realized. Thus, the price of a good that
will be produced and sold in period t, denoted by P ￿
t , is set at the end of
















Ct. The implied optimal price











3.3 Stock Prices: Fundamental and Bubble Compo-
nents
For future reference, it is convenient to de￿ne at this stage the two compo-
nents that constitute the price of a stock, as well as its aggregate counter-
parts. For a ￿rm created in period t, the initial fundamental value, denoted
by QF
tjt, is given by its expected discounted dividend. For ￿rms created in






Et f￿t;t+1Dt+1g for k = 0





tjt￿k denote the aggregate fundamental value of
existing stocks, it follows trivially that
Q
F
t = Et f￿t;t+1Dt+1g (11)
The bubble component of a stock, denoted by QB
tjt￿k, is de￿ned as the
di⁄erence between its market price and its fundamental component. Given










for k = 0;1;2;:::.and all t. Note also that free disposal requires that QB
tjt￿k ￿
0 for k = 1;2;:::. Thus, it follows from (12) that QB
tjt ￿ 0 as well. In other
words, the market price of a stock cannot lie below its fundamental value.
For notational convenience I henceforth use Ut ￿ QB
tjt ￿ 0 to denote the
initial bubble component in the price of a stock introduced in period t. For
simplicity, I assume that such a bubble component is identical across stocks
issued in period t, and refer to it as the new bubble. The analysis below is
simpli￿ed, with little loss of generality, by assuming that ut ￿ logUt follows





tjt￿k denote the aggregate market value of stocks intro-
duced in earlier periods, and which currently constitute a pure bubble (since
they will not yield any future dividends). Thus Bt can be thought of as the
current size of the pre-existing bubble. One can then use (12) to derive an
equation describing the dynamics of the aggregate bubble:
Q
B
t ￿ Bt + Ut = Et f￿t;t+1Bt+1g (13)
133.4 Monetary Policy
The central bank is assumed to set the short-term nominal interest rate it
according to the following rule:





t =QB) is the log deviation of the bubble from its steady
state value. Note that under the above rule the real interest rate responds
systematically to ￿ uctuations in in￿ ation and the size of the bubble, with a
strength indexed by ￿￿ and ￿b, respectively.10
Note that, by adopting the speci￿cation above I abstract from the di¢ -
culties in identifying the presence of a bubble and determining its size that
undoubtedly arise in practice and which constitute one of the arguments
mada by critics of "leaning gainst the wind" policies. The focus of the analy-
sis below is thus the desirability of having the central bank respond to bubble
￿ uctuations, leaving aside practical questions of implementation.
10As an alternative I have also analyzed the speci￿cation
it = r + ￿￿￿t + ￿bb qB
t
The main qualitative results obtained under (14) carry over to this alternative speci￿-
cation, though the analysis is (algebraically) more complicated in the latter case.
Similarly, the more general rule
it = r + ￿￿￿t + ￿bb bt + ￿ub ut
does not yield any further insights and can be shown to collapse to rule of the form (14)
under the optimal policy. In order to keep the algebra as simple as possible I stick to (14)
in what follows.
144 Equilibrium
In the present section I derive the model￿ s remaining equilibrium conditions.
The clearing of the market for each good requires that Yt(i) = C1;t(i)+C2;t(i)







output, we can use the consumer￿ s optimality conditions (3) and (4) to derive
the aggregate goods market clearing condition:










+ (Dt + Bt)
where the second equality follows from (5) and the fact that C2;t = Dt + Bt.
The latter result is a consequence of the market clearing requirement that
Zt = 0 for all t, since all households in a given cohort are identical (and hence
do not trade any assets among themselves), and there is no room for credit
transactions between households from di⁄erent cohorts.











where the third equality follows from (15) and the fact that all ￿rms set
identical prices in equilibrium. Thus, aggregate output supply is constant
and equal to unity.
Adding the budget constraint of the two cohorts coexisting in period t we
obtain C1;t + C2;t = Wt + Dt, which combined with (15) and (16) implies
Dt + Wt = 1 (17)
15Finally, evaluating the optimal price-setting condition at the symmetric
equilibrium and using C2;t = Dt + Bt we have:
Et￿1 f(1=(Dt + Bt))(1 ￿ MWt)g = 0 (18)
Equations (15) through (18), combined with (11), (13) and (14) intro-
duced earlier, describe the equilibrium dynamics of the model economy. In
order to make some progress in describing those dynamics, however, the
analysis below focuses on the log-linearized system around a deterministic
steady state. I start by characterizing the latter.
4.0.1 Steady State
Next I consider a deterministic steady state in which all real variables are
constant with Ut = U ￿ EfUtg, and study under what conditions a positive
bubble may arise in that steady state. The following equations characterize
the steady state values of the model￿ s main aggregate variables:
Y = 1
W = 1=M
D = 1 ￿ 1=M
Q
F = (1=R)(1 ￿ 1=M)
Q
B = U=(1 ￿ R) (19)
B = (R=(1 ￿ R))U (20)
R = (1=￿)(1 ￿ 1=M + B)=(1=M ￿ B) ￿ R(B) (21)
￿ = 0
16where R ￿ expfrg can be interpreted the steady state (gross) real interest
rate.
As made clear by (19) and (20), in order for a well de￿ned steady state
with a positive bubble (henceforth, a "bubbly steady state") to exist we
require that R 2 (0;1), thus implying a negative (net) real interest rate.
The need for this condition is well understood: in its absence the bubble
would grow unboundedly, so no steady state would exist. Furthermore, that
unbounded growth in the size of the bubble would eventually lead to a vi-
olation of the resource constraint, and it would thus be inconsistent with
equilibrium.11 Note also that non-negativity of consumption of the young
cohort requires that B 2 (0;1=M), i.e. the size of the existing bubble can-
not be larger than the resources of the young. Combining both requirements
with steady state condition (21) allows us to state the following Lemma
Lemma 1: A necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of a
bubbly steady state is given by
M < 1 + ￿ (22)
Proof: (Necessity) Note that R(B), as de￿ned in (21), is a continuous,
strictly increasing function of B. In order for a bubbly steady state to exist we
must have R(0) = (M￿1)=￿ < 1, for otherwise R > 1 for any B 2 (0;1=M).
(Su¢ ciency) If M < 1 + ￿, then R(0) = (M ￿ 1)=￿ < 1 2 (0;1), implying
that R(B) < 1 for some B 2 (0;1=M).
11As is well known, the introduction of secular productivity growth.makes it possible to
reconcile the existence of a bubbly steady state with a positive real interest rate (see, e.g.
Tirole (1985)). See below for further discussion.
17Remark #1. Note that (22) is equivalent to R(0) < 1, which corresponds
to a negative (net) interest rate in the bubbleless steady state. The latter
is in turn associated with a Pareto suboptimal allocation since it implies
1=C1 < ￿=C2.and, hence, the possibility of making all cohorts better of by
transferring resources from the young to the old (which is what a bubble
does). A similar condition holds in the models of Samuelson (1958) and
Tirole (1985).
Remark #2. Condition (22) implies an upper bound BU ￿ 1=M￿1=(1+
￿) on the steady state size of the bubble, determined by R(BU) = 1 Note
that BU < 1=M, i.e. this new upper bound is more stringent than the one
associated with a non-negative consumption for the young.
Remark #3. The existence of a bubbly steady state implies the existence
of a continuum of them, represented by the set f(B;R)jR = R(B);B 2
(0;BU)g. That set is represented by the solid line in Figure 1, under the
assumption that ￿ = 1 and M = 1:2. I henceforth refer to the latter as the
baseline calibration.12
4.0.2 Extension: The Case of Positive Deterministic Growth
The analysis above has been conducted under the assumption of a stationary
technology. Consider instead a technology Yt(i) = AtNt(i) with constant pro-
ductivity growth, i.e. At = ￿t and ￿ > 1. It is easy to check that under this
modi￿ed technology the model above implies the existence of an equilibrium
with balanced growth. In particular, it can be easily shown that all the equi-
librium conditions derived above still hold, with the original real variables
12None of the qualitative results emphasized below hinge on the particular calibration
used, as long as it satis￿es.the condition for existence of a bubbly steady state.
18(output, consumption, dividend, wage, stock prices, and, eventually, bub-
ble size) now normalized by parameter At, and with Rt being replaced with
e Rt ￿ Rt=￿. Accordingly, a bubble can exist along the balanced growth path
(i.e. a steady state of the normalized system) only if e R < 1 or, equivalently,
R < ￿, i.e. as long as the real interest rate is below the economy￿ s growth
rate. Such a bubble would be growing at the same rate as the economy. An
analogous result was shown in Samuelson (1958) and Tirole (1985), among
others. That extension allows one to reconcile the existence of a bubbly
equilibrium with the steady state (net) real interest rate being positive.
4.0.3 Linearized Dynamics
Next I linearize the model￿ s equilibrium conditions around the zero in￿ ation
steady state and analyze the resulting system of di⁄erence equations. Unless
otherwise noted I use lower case letters to denote the log of the original
variable, and the symbolbto indicate the deviation from the corresponding
steady state value. The resulting equilibrium conditions are:
0 = b q
F
t + ￿Rb dt + ￿B(1 + ￿)Rb bt + ￿B(1 ￿ R)b ut (23)
b q
B
t = Etfb bt+1g ￿ b rt (24)
b q
F
t = Etfb dt+1g ￿ b rt (25)
b q
B
t = Rb bt + (1 ￿ R)b ut (26)
b rt =b it ￿ Etf￿t+1g (27)
b it = Etf￿t+1g + ￿￿￿t + ￿bb q
B
t (28)
19Under ￿ exible prices the real wage and the aggregate dividend are con-
stant, implying
b wt = b dt = 0 (29)
On the other hand, under sticky prices, log-linearization of (18) yields
Et￿1fb wtg = Et￿1fb dtg = 0 (30)
i.e. both wages and dividends remain, in expectation, at their steady state
value. Finally, note that one can combine (24) and (26) to obtain
b bt = Rb bt￿1 + (1 ￿ R)b ut￿1 + b rt￿1 + ￿t (31)
where f￿tg is an arbitrary martingale-di⁄erence process (i.e. Et￿1f￿tg = 0 for
all t). As discussed above, and in order to avoid embedding in the model an
arbitrary link between monetary policy and the size of the bubble, I assume
that ￿t is an exogenous sunspot shock. By making this assumption I force
monetary policy to in￿ uence the size of the bubble only through the interest
rate channel and not through an (arbitrary) indeterminacy channel.
4.1 Natural Equilibrium
I refer to the equilibrium under ￿ exible prices as the natural equilibrium,
and denote the corresponding equilibrium values with a superscript "n". As
discussed above, when ￿rms can adjust freely their prices once the shocks
are realized, they optimally choose to maintain a constant gross markup M.
This, in turn, implies that the wage and dividend remain constant at their
steady state values. As a result, the goods market clearing condition (23),
combined with (25), implies:
b r
n
t = ￿B(1 + ￿)Rb b
n
t + ￿B(1 ￿ R)b ut (32)
20The previous condition makes clear that the real interest rate is, as ex-
pected, independent of monetary policy.under ￿ exible prices. Plugging the
previous result in (31):
b b
n
t = ￿b b
n
t￿1 + (1 ￿ R)(1 + ￿B)b ut￿1 + ￿t
where ￿ ￿ R(1 + ￿B(1 + ￿)). Stationarity of the bubble requires ￿ 2 [0;1),
which I henceforth assume.13 Note that the latter condition will always be
satis￿ed for a su¢ ciently small steady state bubble B, given the continuity
and monotonicity of R(B) and the fact that limB!0 ￿ = R(0) < 1 holds
whenever a bubbly steady state exists (as assumed here). Furthermore, note
that R(B)(1 + ￿B(1 + ￿)) = 1 implicitly de￿nes an upper bound B > 0
on the size of the steady state bubble consistent with stationarity of bubble
￿ uctuations. It can be easily checked that the upper bound implied by the
previous stationarity requirement is tighter than the one associated with the
existence of a deterministic bubbly steady state, i.e. B < BU ￿ 1=M ￿
1=(1 + ￿).14 The circled locus in Figure 1 displays the subset of bubbly
steady states that are consistent with stationary ￿ uctuations in the size of
the bubble.
Note that under ￿ exible prices, monetary policy has no in￿ uence on the
evolution of the bubble, due to its inability to a⁄ect the real interest rate.
Naturally, though, monetary policy can in￿ uence in￿ ation (and other nomi-
nal variables). In particular, equilibrium in￿ ation can be derived by combin-
ing the interest rate rule (28) with (26) and (32) to yield:
13That stationarity assumption also justi￿es the use of methods based on a log-linear
approximation of the equilibrium conditions.
14This can be proved by noting that (i) both ￿(B) and R(B) are strictly increasing in
B, (ii) ￿(0) = R(0) and (iii) ￿(B) > R(B) for all B 2 (0;BU).
21￿t = ￿(1=￿￿)
￿
(￿b ￿ ￿B(1 + ￿))Rb b
n
t + (￿b ￿ ￿B)(1 ￿ R)b ut
￿
Not surprisingly the impact of bubbles on in￿ ation is not independent of
the monetary policy rule. In particular, we see that some positive systematic
response of the interest rate to the aggregate bubble (￿b > 0) is desirable
from the viewpoint of in￿ ation stabilization. More precisely, the value of
￿b that minimizes the variance of in￿ ation under ￿ exible prices is given by
￿b = ￿B(1 + ￿￿) > 0, where ￿ ￿ R2varfb bn
t g=(R2varfb bn
t g + (1 ￿ R)2￿2
u).
Of course, there is no special reason why the central bank would want to
stabilize in￿ ation in the present environment, so I do not analyze this issue
further here.15
4.2 Sticky Price Equilibrium
As discussed above, in the presence of sticky prices we have
Et￿1fb wtg = Et￿1fb dtg = 0 (33)
for all t. Note also that the fact that prices are predetermined implies:
Et￿1f￿tg = ￿t (34)
Combining the previous equations with equilibrium conditions (24), (27)
and (28) one can derive the following closed form solution for the evolution
15It is easy to check that the central bank could fully stabilize in￿ ation in this case if it
could identify and respond separately to existing and new bubbles with a rule
b it = ￿￿￿t + ￿bb bt + ￿ub ut
22of the bubble (see Appendix for details):
b bt = ￿b bt￿1 + (￿b + 1)(1 ￿ R)b ut￿1 + ￿t + (￿b ￿ ￿B(1 + ￿))R￿t￿1 (35)
Thus we see that ￿ uctuations in the size of bubble follow an ARMA(1,1)
process. The persistence of those ￿ uctuations, as measured by the autore-
gressive coe¢ cient ￿ ￿ R(1 + ￿B(1 + ￿)), is the same as in the natural
equilibrium and, hence, independent of monetary policy. The latter, how-
ever, can in￿ uence the bubble￿ s overall size and volatility through the choice
of interest rate rule coe¢ cient ￿b, as made clear by (35). This is discussed
in detail in the following section.
Through its in￿ uence on the size of the bubble b bt and on the fundamental
component of stock prices, b qF
t = ￿b rt, monetary policy will in turn a⁄ect the
allocation of aggregate consumption between the cohorts coexisting at any
point in time, thus a⁄ecting welfare.
On the other hand, equilibrium in￿ ation is given by the AR(1) process16
￿t = ￿￿t￿1 ￿ (1=￿￿)(￿b ￿ ￿B(1 + ￿)R)(￿b + 1)"t￿1
where "t ￿ R￿t +(1￿R)b ut is the innovation in the aggregate bubble (which
in turn is a result of innovation in the pre-existing bubble as well as the new
bubble). Thus, we see that in￿ ation inherits the persistence of the aggregate
bubble and is in￿ uenced by innovations in the latter as well as by the size of
the new bubbles, interacting with the central bank￿ s feedback ru le.
16See Appendix for details.
235 The Impact of Monetary Policy on Bubble
Dynamics
As made clear by the analysis in the previous section, the existence of bubbles
in the present model economy is not a monetary phenomenon. In other
words, the conditions for their existence do not depend on how monetary
policy is conducted.
When prices are ￿ exible, monetary policy is neutral vis a vis the bubble:
it cannot have an e⁄ect either on its size or on its persistence. Nevertheless,
and given that ￿ uctuations in the size of the bubble a⁄ect the natural rate
of interest, the monetary authority may want to respond systematically to
bubble developments if it wishes to stabilize in￿ ation. In particular, it will
have to raise the interest rate in response to increases in the size of the
bubble.
On the other hand, in the presence of nominal rigidities, monetary policy
can have an e⁄ect on the size and volatility of the anticipated component
of the bubble, b be
t ￿ Et￿1fb btg. As shown in the Appendix, the latter evolves
according to the simple AR(1) process:
b b
e
t = ￿b b
e
t￿1 + (￿b + 1)"t￿1 (36)
where, again, "t ￿ R￿t + (1 ￿ R)b ut.
Thus we see that the in￿ uence of monetary policy on the anticipated com-
ponent of the bubble works through the choice of the interest rate coe¢ cient
￿b. To see how that choice in￿ uences the volatility of the aggregate bubble
b qB
t note that (36), together with the fact that
b q
B
t = Rb b
e














￿ + (1 ￿ R)2￿2
u is the variance of the aggregate bubble in-
novation. That relation is illustrated graphically in Figure 2, which displays
the standard deviation of the aggregate bubble as a function of ￿b.17
An analysis of that relation yields several results of interest (all of which
are re￿ ected in Figure 1). Firstly, equation (38) implies that a "leaning
against the wind" policy (corresponding to ￿b > 0) generates a larger volatil-
ity in the bubble size than a policy of "benign neglect" (￿b = 0). Secondly,
and conditional on ￿b ￿ 0, the stronger is the positive feedback from the bub-
ble to the interest rate, the larger is the volatility of the former (!). Finally,
the central bank can minimize the bubble volatility by setting ￿b = ￿1 < 0 a
policy which fully stabilizes the anticipated component of the bubble (i.e. it
implies b be
t = 0, for all t). In other words, stabilization of bubble ￿ uctuations
requires that the interest rate be lowered in response to positive innovations
in existing or new bubbles, a ￿nding clearly at odds with conventional wis-
dom.
We can also use the equilibrium expression for the fundamental stock
price (as derived in Appendix 1):
b q
F
t = ￿￿B(1 + ￿)Rb b
e
t ￿ ￿b"t
together with the fact that
b qt = (1 ￿ ￿B)b q
F
t + ￿Bb q
B
t
17The following calibration is assumed: ￿ = 1, M = 1:2, B = 0:1 and ￿2
￿ = ￿2
u = 0:01.
25where ￿B ￿ ￿B
￿B+1 2 [0;1] in order to derive expressions for their respective
variances. Figure 3 displays the volatility of the stock price index b qt, together
that of its fundamental and bubble components,b qF
t and b qB
t , as a function of
coe¢ cient ￿b. Note that the three mappings are non-monotonic and increas-
ing after a certain threshold (di⁄erent in each case) is reached. Thus, we see
that an aggressive "leaning against the wind" policy in response to bubbles
may have a potentially destabilizing e⁄ect on stock prices, as well as in their
fundamental and bubble components.
Equilibrium in￿ ation in the economy with sticky prices satis￿es
￿t = ￿(R=￿￿)(￿b ￿ ￿B(1 + ￿))b b
e
t
i.e., in￿ ation is proportional to the anticipated bubble. Thus, the central
bank can follow three alternative strategies if it seeks to stabilize in￿ ation.
First, it can respond very strongly to in￿ ation itself (by setting ￿￿ arbitrarily
large, for any ￿nite ￿b). Secondly, it can adjust interest rates in response to
￿ uctuations in the bubble with a strength given by ￿b = ￿b (while setting
￿￿ at a ￿nite value) Doing so exactly o⁄sets the impact of the bubble on
(expected) aggregate demand, thus neutralizing its impact on in￿ ation. Note
that neither of these policies eliminates ￿ uctuations in the bubble, they just
prevent the latter from a⁄ecting the aggregate price level. Finally, the central
bank may choose to stabilize the anticipated component of the bubble b be
t,
which can be achieved by setting ￿b = ￿1, as discussed above. The latter
result illustrates how the emergence of an aggregate bubble and the existence
of ￿ uctuations in the latter do not necessarily generate a policy trade-o⁄
26between stabilization of the bubble and stabilization of in￿ ation.18
Note however that in the economy above, with synchronized price-setting
and an inelastic labor supply, in￿ ation is not a source of welfare losses. Ac-
cordingly, and within the logic of the model, there is no reason why the
central bank should seek to stabilize in￿ ation. It is also not clear that mini-
mizing the volatility of the aggregate bubble constitutes a desirable objective
in itself. In order to clarify those issues, the next section analyzes explicitly
the nature of the model￿ s implied optimal policy.
6 Optimal Monetary Policy in the Bubbly
Economy
Next I turn to an analysis of the optimal response of monetary policy to
asset price bubbles in the model economy developed above. I take as a
welfare criterion the unconditional mean of an individual￿ s lifetime utility.
In a neighborhood of the steady state that mean can be approximated as
EflogC1;t + ￿ logC2;t+1g ’ logC1 + ￿ logC2 ￿ (1=2)(varfb c1;tg + ￿varfb c2;tg)
where b ci;t ￿ log(Ci;t=Ci) for i = 1;2.
Note that the goods market clearing condition C1;t + C2;t = 1 implies
that varfb c1;tg is proportional to varfb c2;tg. Thus, a central bank that seeks
to maximize welfare under the criterion set above will choose the interest
rate rule coe¢ cients that minimize the variance of
b c2;t = (1 ￿ ￿B)b dt + ￿Bb bt
18The absence of a trade-o⁄ obtains when, as assumed above, bubble shocks are the
only source of uncertainty in the economy. Other sources of ￿ uctuations may require
interest rate adjustments in order to stabilize in￿ ation, which in turn may induce additional
volatility in the size of the bubble.
27where ￿B ￿ ￿B
￿B+1 2 [0;1]
That objective poses a dilemma for the central bank. To see this note
that, as derived in the Appendix, dividends are given by
b dt / (￿b ￿ ￿B(1 + ￿))R￿t + (￿b ￿ ￿B)(1 ￿ R)b ut
Thus, minimizing the volatility of dividends calls for setting ￿b = ￿B(1+
￿R2(￿2
￿=￿2
")) > 0. Note that such a policy would require adjusting the inter-
est rate upward in response to positive bubble shocks, in order to stabilize
aggregate demand and to prevent upward (downward) pressure on wages
(dividends) from emerging. However, as discussed in the previous section,
such a policy would amplify the impact of current bubble shocks on the fu-
ture size of the bubble, through the e⁄ect of interest rates on bubble growth,
thus contributing to destabilization of cohort-speci￿c consumption through
that channel. In fact, and as discussed above, minimizing the volatility of
cohort-speci￿c consumption resulting from bubble ￿ uctuations calls for set-
ting ￿b = ￿1 < 0. Note ￿nally that neither the volatility of dividends nor
that of the bubble depend on the in￿ ation coe¢ cient ￿￿.
The welfare-maximizing choice of ￿b will naturally seek a compromise
between stabilization of dividends and stabilization of the bubble size. For-
mally, the optimal coe¢ cient minimizes










Figure 4 displays the expected welfare loss as a function of ￿b, under the
model￿ s baseline calibration. The minimum of that loss function determines
28the optimal interest rate coe¢ cient. The latter can be written as:
￿
￿
b = (￿1)￿B + ￿B(1 ￿ ￿B) (39)
where ￿B ￿
(￿R￿B)2
1￿￿2+(￿r￿B)2 2 [0;1] is an increasing function of B, the steady
state size of the bubble (relative to the economy￿ s size).
Thus, the optimal strength of the central bank￿ s response to the bubble
is a nonlinear function of the average size of the latter, as well as other
exogenous parameters. Figure 5 displays the optimal coe¢ cient ￿
￿
b as a
function of B, under the baseline calibration for the remaining parameters.
Note that the mapping is non-monotonic: ￿
￿
b is shown to be ￿rst increasing,
and then decreasing, in the size of the bubble. As the steady state size of the
bubble approaches zero, so does the optimal coe¢ cient, i.e. limB!0 ￿
￿
b = 0.
On the other hand, as B approaches its maximum value consistent with
stationarity, the optimal coe¢ cient converges to (minus) the corresponding
interest rate, i.e. limB!B ￿
￿
b = ￿1 < 0. Hence, given a su¢ ciently large
steady state bubble, it is optimal for the central bank to lower interest rates
in response to a rise in the size of the bubble.
The latter ￿nding illustrates that the optimal monetary policy strategy
in response to asset price bubbles does not necessarily take the form of a
"leaning against the wind" policy or one of just "benign neglect".
7 Discussion and Some Evidence
The main purpose of the present paper has been to call into question the
theoretical underpinnings of proposals for "leaning against the wind" mon-
etary policies with respect to asset price developments. According to those
29proposals central banks should raise interest rates in the face of a developing
asset price bubble, in order to tame it or eliminate it altogether. The analy-
sis above has shown that, at least when it comes to a rational asset pricing
bubble, such a policy may be counterproductive and lead instead to larger
bubble ￿ uctuations and possibly lower welfare as well. In the example econ-
omy developed above, it is generally desirable from the viewpoint of bubble
stabilization (and, under some assumptions, from a welfare perspective as
well) to pursue the opposite policy. That ￿nding, which is a consequence of a
basic arbitrage constraint that must be satis￿ed by a rational bubble, seems
to have been ignored (or, at least, swept under the rug) by proponents of
leaning against the wind policies.
To be clear, it is not my intention to suggest that policies that seek to
prevent the emergence of bubbles or its excessive growth are necessarily mis-
guided, but only to point out that certain interest rate policies advocated by
a number of economists and policymakers may not always have the desired
e⁄ects. There are at least three assumptions in the model above which un-
doubtedly play an important role in accounting for my ￿ndings. I discuss
them brie￿ y next.
Firstly, I have assumed that there is no systematic impact of interest rate
surprises on the "indeterminate" component of the bubble. Some readers
may ￿nd that assumption arbitrary. But it would be equally arbitrary to
assume the existence of a systematic relation of a given size or sign. Whether
that systematic relation exists is ultimately an empirical issue, but one that
will not be settled easily given the inherent unobservability of bubbles. In
any event, the analysis in the present paper points to the fragility of the
30foundations of a leaning against the wind policy advocated on the basis of
such a systematic relation.
Secondly, the asset pricing bubbles introduced in the above model econ-
omy are of the rational type, i.e. they are consistent with rational expec-
tations on the part of all agents in the economy. In actual economies there
may be asset price deviations from fundamentals that are di⁄erent in nature
from the rational bubbles considered here and for which leaning against the
wind interest rate policies may have more desirable properties. Assessing
that possibility would require the explicit modelling of the nature of devia-
tions from fundamentals, and how those deviations are in￿ uenced by interest
rate policy. Of course, one should not rule out the possibility that di⁄erent
models of non-rational bubbles may lead to entirely di⁄erent implications
regarding the desirability of leaning against the wind policies.
Thirdly, the analysis above has been conducted in a model economy with
no explicit ￿nancial sector and no ￿nancial market imperfections (other than
the existence of bubbles). In fact, the assumption of a representative con-
sumer in each cohort implies that the only ￿nancial transactions actually
carried out are the sale of stocks by the old to the young, but no credit
is needed (in equilibrium) to ￿nance such transactions. By contrast, much
of the empirical and policy-oriented literature has emphasized the risks as-
sociated with the rapid credit expansion that often accompanies (and helps
￿nance) asset price booms.19 It is not clear, however, that a tighter monetary
policy may be the best way to counter the credit-based speculative bubbles
that may arise in this context, as opposed to a stricter regulatory and super-
19See, e.g., Schularick and Taylor (2009).
31visory framework with the necessary tools to dampen the growth of credit
allocated to (potentially destabilizing) speculative activities. Further e⁄orts
at modelling explicitly the interaction of credit, bubbles and monetary policy
would seem highly welcome.
What does the empirical evidence have to say about the impact of mon-
etary policy on asset price bubbles? It is clear that any empirical analysis
of that link faces many challenges. Firstly, the di¢ culty (or, some may say,
impossibility) in identifying the bubble component of an asset certainly does
not facilitate the task. Secondly, any observed comovement between asset
prices and policy rates may be distorted by the presence of reverse causality,
if the central bank does indeed adjust the interest rate in response to asset
price movements.
Those caveats notwithstanding, I ￿nd it informative to take a look at
the the behavior of the interest rate and the relevant asset price during three
episodes of U.S. history generally viewed (at least ex-post) as associated with
the presence of a large and growing bubble, which subsequently burst: (i)
the stock market boom previous to the Great Crash of October 1929, (ii) the
dotcom bubble of the second half of the 1990s, and (iii) the housing bubble
leading to the ￿nancial crisis of 2007-2008.
Figure 5 shows the Dow-Jones Industrial Stock Price Index along with
the discount rate at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, over the period
1927:1-1929:9. Figure 6 displays the NASDAQ Composite Index together
with the Federal Funds rate target over the period 1997:1-2000:1. Finally,
Figure 7 shows the Case-Shiller House Price Index (Composite 20) and, again,
the Federal Funds rate target, now over the period 2002:1-2007:4. The three
32episodes share two key features. First, the corresponding asset price index
experiences a very fast, largely uninterrupted, rise which is hard to account
for by any plausible revision of fundamentals. The subsequent collapse (not
displayed in the Figures) reinforces the interpretation of much of that rise
as resulting from a bubble. Secondly, in the three episodes the asset price
boom is eventually accompanied with a substantial rise in the policy rate.
The latter might have been partly intended to counter the growing bubble.
Most importantly, however, for the purposes of the present paper, is the ob-
servation that the large increase in the policy rate (whatever its motivation)
does not seem to have any signi￿cant impact on the path of asset prices.20
That observation would seem to be at odds with the presumptions behind
the "leaning against the wind" view, namely, that a hike in interest rates
should help prick (or at least) disin￿ ate any developing bubble (in addition
to having an adverse side e⁄ect on the asset￿ s fundamental). On the other
hand it seems to be consistent with the predictions of the model above, ac-
cording to which a rise in the interest rate will generally enhance the growth
of the bubble and, if the latter is su¢ ciently large, that of the asset price as
well.
8 Concluding Remarks
In order to do so I have developed a highly stylized overlapping generations
model with monopolistic competition and price setting in advance. The over-
20Thus, the Fed￿ s attempt to stop the rise in stock prices through a series of interest
rate increases 1928-1929 has been interpreted by a number of authors as the main factor
behind the initial decline in activity during the Great Depression (see Bernanke (2002)
and references therein).
33lapping generations structure allows for the existence of asset price bubbles in
equilibrium, as in the models of Samuelson (1958) and Tirole (1982). The in-
troduction of nominal rigigities implies that monetary policy is not neutral.
In particular, by in￿ uencing the path of the real interest rate, the central
bank can a⁄ect real asset prices (including those of bubbly assets) and, as a
result, the distribution of consumption across cohorts and welfare.
Two main results have emerged from the analysis of that model. First,
contrary to conventional wisdom, a stronger interest rate response to bub-
ble ￿ uctuations (i.e. a "leaning against the wind policy") may raise the
volatility of asset prices and of their bubble component. Secondly, the opti-
mal policy must strike a balance between stabilization of current aggregate
demand￿ which calls for a positive interest rate response to the bubble￿ and
stabilization of the bubble itself (and hence of future aggregate demand)￿
which would warrant a negative interest rate response to the bubble. If the
average size of the bubble is su¢ ciently large the latter motive will be dom-
inant, making it optimal for the central bank to lower interest rates in the
face of a growing bubble.
Needless to say the conclusions should not be taken at face value when it
comes to designing actual policies. This is so because the model may not pro-
vide an accurate representation of the challenges facing actual policy makers.
In particular, it may very well be the case that actual bubbles are not of the
rational type and, hence, respond to monetary policy changes in ways not
captured bt the theory above. In addition, the model above abstracts from
many aspects of actual economies that may be highly relevant when designing
monetary policy in bubbly economies, including the presence frictions and
34imperfect information in ￿nancial markets. Those caveats notwithstanding,
the analysis above may be useful by pointing out an potentially important
missing link in the case for "leaning against the wind" policies.
35Appendix
Appendix 1.
Combine (23), (25) and (33) to yield:
Et￿1fb rtg = ￿B(1 + ￿)REt￿1fb btg (40)
Taking expectations on both sides of the interest rate rule:
Et￿1fb rtg = ￿￿￿t + ￿bREt￿1fb btg (41)
Combining both yields
￿t = ￿(R=￿￿)(￿b ￿ ￿B(1 + ￿))Et￿1fb btg
Letting "t ￿ R￿t + (1 ￿ R)b ut, note that
b rt = Et￿1fb rtg + (b rt ￿ Et￿1fb rtg)
= ￿B(1 + ￿)REt￿1fb btg + ￿b"t
= ￿B(1 + ￿)R(Rb bt￿1 + (1 ￿ R)b ut￿1 + b rt￿1) + ￿b"t
It follows that
(1 ￿ ￿B(1 + ￿)RL)b rt = ￿B(1 + ￿)R(Rb bt￿1 + (1 ￿ R)b ut￿1) + ￿b"t
Combining the previous result with the bubble di⁄erence equation (1 ￿
RL)b bt = (1 ￿ R)b ut￿1 + b rt￿1 + ￿t yields:
b bt = ￿b bt￿1 + (￿b + 1)(1 ￿ R)b ut￿1 + ￿t + (￿b ￿ ￿B(1 + ￿))R￿t￿1
where, as above, ￿ ￿ R(1 + ￿(1 + ￿)B) is assumed to be between zero and
one.
36Note that the predictable component of the bubble follows the process
Et￿1fb btg = ￿(Et￿2fb bt￿1g + ￿t￿1) + (￿b + 1)(1 ￿ R)b ut￿1 + (￿b ￿ ￿B(1 + ￿))R￿t￿1
= ￿Et￿2fb bt￿1g + (￿b + 1)"t￿1
Accordingly, and letting b be
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Note also that we can now write the equilibrium process for in￿ ation as:
￿t = ￿(R=￿￿)(￿b ￿ ￿B(1 + ￿))b b
e
t




t = ￿b rt
= ￿￿￿￿t ￿ ￿b(Rb b
e
t + "t)








(￿B(1 + ￿)R)2(￿b + 1)2








37Goods market clearing implies
0 = b q
F
t + ￿Rb dt + ￿B(1 ￿ R)b ut + ￿B(1 + ￿)Rb bt
= ￿b rt + ￿Rb dt + ￿B(1 ￿ R)b ut + ￿B(1 + ￿)Rb bt
Using the fact that b rt = (b rt￿Et￿1fb rtg)+Et￿1fb rtg = ￿b"t+￿B(1+￿)Rb be
t,
one can write
￿Rb dt = ￿b(R￿t + (1 ￿ R)b ut) + ￿B(1 + ￿)Rb b
e
t ￿ (￿B(1 ￿ R)b ut + ￿B(1 + ￿)Rb bt)
= (￿b ￿ ￿B(1 + ￿))R￿t + (￿b ￿ ￿B)(1 ￿ R)b ut
Letting ￿B ￿ ￿B
￿B+1 we have
￿Rb c2;t = ￿R((1 ￿ ￿B)b dt + ￿Bb bt)
= (1 ￿ ￿B)￿R(b dt + ￿Bb bt)
= (1 ￿ ￿B)((￿b ￿ ￿B(1 + ￿))R￿t + (￿b ￿ ￿B)(1 ￿ R)b ut + ￿R￿Bb bt)















Bernanke, Ben S. (2002): "Asset Price Bubbles and Monetary Policy,"
speech before the New York Chapter of the National Association of Business
Economists.
Bernanke, Ben S. and Mark Gertler (1999): "Monetary Policy and Asset
Price Volatility," in New Challenges for Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City, 77-128.
Bernanke, Ben S. and Mark Gertler (2001): "Should Central Banks Re-
spond to Movements in Asset Prices?" American Economic Review 91(2),
253-257.
Borio, Claudio and Philip Lowe (2002): "Asset Prices, Financial and
Monetary Stability: Exploring the Nexus," BIS Working Papers no. 114.
Cecchetti, Stephen G., Hans Gensberg, John Lipsky and Sushil Wadhwani
(2000): Asset Prices and Central Bank Policy, Geneva Reports on the World
Economy 2, CEPR.
Kohn, Donald L. (2006): "Monetary Policy and Asset Prices," speech
at an ECB colloquium on "Monetary Policy: A Journey from Theory to
Practice," held in honor of Otmar Issing.
Kohn, Donald L. (2008): "Monetary Policy and Asset Prices Revisited,"
speech delivered at the Caton Institute￿ s 26th Annual Monetary Policy Con-
ference, Washington, D.C.
Samuelson, Paul A. (1958): "An exact consumption-loan model of inter-
est with or without the social contrivance of money," Journal of Political
Economy 66, 467-482.
Santos, Manuel S. and Michael Woodford (1997): "Rational asset Pricing
39Bubbles," Econometrica 65(1), 19-57.
Tirole, Jean (1985): "Asset Bubbles and Overlapping Generations," Econo-
metrica 53, 1499-1528.
40Figure 1.  Bubbly Steady States 














fluctuationsFigure 2. Monetary Policy and Bubble Volatility 




































nFigure 3. Monetary Policy and the Volatility of 
Stock Prices and its Components 



































fundamental componentFigure 4. Monetary Policy and Welfare Losses 



















sFigure 5.  Optimal  Bubble Coefficient 































tFigure 6. Monetary Policy and the  

















Stock Price Index  Discount Rate Figure 7.  Monetary Policy and the Dotcom Bubble Figure 8.  Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble 